Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The Chip Authentication Programme (CAP) has been introduced by banks in Europe to deal with the soaring losses due to online banking fraud. A handheld reader is used together with the customer's debit card to generate one-time codes for both login and transaction authentication. The CAP protocol is not public, and was rolled out without any public scrutiny. We reverse engineered the UK variant of card readers and smart cards and here provide the first public description of the protocol. We found numerous weaknesses that are due to design errors such as reusing authentication tokens, overloading data semantics, and failing to ensure freshness of responses. The overall strategic error was excessive optimisation. There are also policy implications. The move from signature to PIN for authorising point-of-sale transactions shifted liability from banks to customers; CAP introduces the same problem for online banking. It may also expose customers to physical harm. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2009 | 10.1007/978-3-642-03549-4_11 | Financial Cryptography |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
online banking,transaction authentication,card reader,cap protocol,card readers,authentication token,debit card,public scrutiny,smart card,banking fraud,public description,authentication,chip,one time password,chip and pin,reverse engineering | Internet privacy,Authentication,Chip Authentication Program,Card reader,Computer science,Computer security,Login,Smart card,Debit card,Database transaction,Security token | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
5628 | 0302-9743 | 42 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
3.54 | 7 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Saar Drimer | 1 | 272 | 19.92 |
| Steven J. Murdoch | 2 | 806 | 57.90 |
| Ross J. Anderson | 3 | 5349 | 971.91 |