Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We propose a general equivalent inner key recovery attack to the NMAC (Nested Message Authentication Code) instantiated with secure hash function in a related key setting, by applying a generalized birthday attack with two groups. We can recover the equivalent inner key of NMAC in about 2(n/2+1) on-line MAC queries. The assumption of that the underlying hash function must be collision resistant is dropped in the security proof of NMAC. However, our result shows that NMAC, even instantiated with a collision resistant Merkle-Damgard hash function, is not secure as its designer claimed. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2012 | 10.1007/978-3-642-33018-6_7 | INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE CISIS'12 - ICEUTE'12 - SOCO'12 SPECIAL SESSIONS |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
NMAC,Equivalent Key Recovery,Verifiable Forgery,Birthday Attack | Message authentication code,Computer science,Computer security,Collision,Birthday attack,Hash function,Key-recovery attack | Conference |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
189 | null | 2194-5357 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 21 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fanbao Liu | 1 | 29 | 4.40 |
| Changxiang Shen | 2 | 127 | 14.57 |
| Tao Xie | 3 | 50 | 5.91 |