Abstract | ||
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The goal of Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) is to generate a sanitized (i.e. harmless) view of sensitive personal data (e.g. a health survey), to be released to some agencies or simply the public. However, traditional PPDP practices all make the assumption that the process is run on a trusted central server. In this article, we argue that the trust assumption on the central server is far too strong. We propose P, a generic fully distributed protocol, to execute various forms of PPDP algorithms on an asymmetric architecture composed of low power secure devices and a powerful but untrusted infrastructure. We show that this protocol is both correct and secure against or adversaries. Finally, we provide an experimental validation showing that this protocol can support PPDP processes scaling up to nation-wide surveys. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2014 | 10.1007/s10619-013-7122-x | Distributed and Parallel Databases |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing,Sanitization,Anonymization,Secure device,Privacy | Architecture,Computer security,Computer science,Data publishing | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
32 | 2 | 0926-8782 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
4 | 0.44 | 39 |
Authors | ||
3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Tristan Allard | 1 | 32 | 2.52 |
Benjamin Nguyen | 2 | 71 | 8.72 |
Philippe Pucheral | 3 | 514 | 71.89 |