Paper Info
Title
A mix-net from any CCA2 secure cryptosystem
Abstract
We construct a provably secure mix-net from any CCA2 secure cryptosystem. The mix-net is secure against active adversaries that statically corrupt less than λ out of k mix-servers, where λ is a threshold parameter, and it is robust provided that at most min (λ−1,k−λ) mix-servers are corrupted. The main component of our construction is a mix-net that outputs the correct result if all mix-servers behaved honestly, and aborts with probability 1−O(H−(t−1)) otherwise (without disclosing anything about the inputs), where t is an auxiliary security parameter and H is the number of honest parties. The running time of this protocol for long messages is roughly 3tc, where c is the running time of Chaum's mix-net (1981).
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_37
ASIACRYPT
Keywords
Field
DocType
cca2 secure cryptosystem,long message,honest party,auxiliary security parameter,provably secure mix-net,threshold parameter,main component,active adversary,k mix-servers,correct result,computer science
Computer science,Computer security,Adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack,Theoretical computer science,Cryptosystem,Security parameter
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
7658
0302-9743
10
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.49
18
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Shahram Khazaei112611.19
Tal Moran243925.36
Douglas Wikström322813.48