Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
A public good is produced if and only if a volunteer provides it. There are many pure-strategy Nash equilibria in each of which a single player volunteers. Noisy strategy revisions (for instance, quantal responses) allow play to evolve. Equilibrium selection is achieved via the characterisation of long-run play as revisions approximate best replies. The volunteer need not be the lowest-cost player: relatively high-cost, but nonetheless “reliable” players may instead produce the public good. More efficient players provide when higher values are associated with lower costs. Voluntary open-source software provision offers a contemporary application. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2008 | 10.1016/j.geb.2007.03.005 | Games and Economic Behavior |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
C72,C73,H41 | Welfare economics,Economics,Mathematical economics,Epsilon-equilibrium,Public good,Best response,Microeconomics,Equilibrium selection,If and only if,Dilemma,Volunteer's dilemma,Nash equilibrium | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
62 | 1 | 0899-8256 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.45 | 3 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| David P. Myatt | 1 | 12 | 2.33 |
| Chris Wallace | 2 | 17 | 5.37 |