Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This paper investigates how firms should select their production sites, capacities and quantities under rivalry. There are assumed to be a finite number of discrete potential location sites and a finite number of discrete markets, which may or may not coincide. Firms first decide either simultaneously or sequentially whether and where to establish a production site. The fixed cost of opening a facility and the marginal cost of production both depend on where the facility is located. Firms then choose capacity and a production quantity for each market. Prices in each market are determined by the total quantity available at that location via the Cournot mechanism. This formulation thus addresses multi-market, oligopolistic spatial competition with heterogeneity in production and logistics costs. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2003 | 10.1016/S0377-2217(02)00445-9 | European Journal of Operational Research |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Location,Competition,Game theory | Economics,Oligopoly,Bertrand paradox (economics),Microeconomics,Factor market,Fixed cost,Marginal cost,First-mover advantage,Nash equilibrium,Industrial organization,Cournot competition | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
149 | 1 | 0377-2217 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
15 | 1.00 | 5 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hosun Rhim | 1 | 16 | 1.36 |
| Teck H. Ho | 2 | 181 | 17.75 |
| Uday S. Karmarkar | 3 | 177 | 19.10 |