Title
On Subgame Perfection in Quantitative Reachability Games
Abstract
We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible. A previous work on this model showed that Nash equilibria (resp. secure equilibria) are guaranteed to exist in the multiplayer (resp. two-player) case. The existence of secure equilibria in the multiplayer case remained and is still an open problem. In this paper, we focus our study on the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium well-suited in the framework of games played on graphs. We also introduce the new concept of subgame perfect secure equilibrium. We prove the existence of subgame perfect equilibria (resp. subgame perfect secure equilibria) in multiplayer (resp. two-player) quantitative reachability games. Moreover, we provide an algorithm deciding the existence of secure equilibria in the multiplayer case.
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.2168/LMCS-9(1:7)2013
Logical Methods in Computer Science
DocType
Volume
Issue
Journal
9
1
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
3
0.39
0
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Thomas Brihaye146035.91
Véronique Bruyère242943.59
Julie De Pril3292.95
Hugo Gimbert424921.31