Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this paper, we investigate how many containers would need to be screened in order to deter attackers from attempting to
smuggle weapons into a defending country in container freight. We hypothesize that with a sufficiently high probability of
being detected, attackers might be deterred from smuggling attempts. Thus, our goal is to identify the optimal proportion
of containers to inspect in order to minimize the defender’s expected loss, using game theory to reflect the fact that attackers
are simultaneously trying to maximize their expected rewards. Moreover, our model recognizes that the container-screening
policy must simultaneously protect against different types of threats (such as nuclear bombs, dirty bombs, and assault rifles).
Finally, our model also suggests that threatening to retaliate against attacks may be beneficial to defenders, as long as
the threat is credible. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2011 | 10.1007/s10479-009-0665-6 | Annals of Operations Research |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Port security,Cargo screening,Game theory,Deterrence,Decision analysis,Smuggling of weapons | Expected loss,Port (computer networking),Deterrence theory,Computer security,Terrorism,Nuclear weapon,Dirty bomb,Game theory,Mathematics,Port security | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
187 | 1 | 0254-5330 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
12 | 0.82 | 3 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vicki M. Bier | 1 | 421 | 40.44 |
| Naraphorn Haphuriwat | 2 | 48 | 4.65 |