Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is a powerful alternative to full rationality equilibrium concepts. At a QRE, all joint
moves have non-zero probability. However in “mixed scenarios”, where some players use quantal response and some use best response,
equilibrium strategy profiles can have joint moves with zero probability. This raises the question of applying the trembling
hand refinement to such mixed scenarios. To address this I first show how to reformulate the QRE as a “best response” equilibrium
where expected utilities are replaced by more general objective functions. I then show that under this reformulation the two
popular types of trembling hand perfection can differ when some players use quantal response and some use best response. I
end by showing that one of those types of trembling hand perfection cannot be used to remove certain troubling kinds of equilibrium
in such mixed scenarios, while the other type can. The conclusion is that only the one type of trembling hand perfection should
be applied when we allow some players to be quantal response and some to be best response. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2009 | 10.1007/s00182-009-0169-2 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
quantal response equilibrium · trembling hand perfection · entropy,expected utility,objective function,entropy | Welfare economics,Mathematical economics,Quantal response equilibrium,Rationality,Best response,Proper equilibrium,Mathematics,Perfection,Trembling hand perfect equilibrium | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
38 | 4 | 1432-1270 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.59 | 3 |
Authors | ||
1 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| David H. Wolpert | 1 | 4334 | 591.07 |