Abstract | ||
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SC2000 is a 128-bit block cipher with a user key of 128, 192 or 256 bits, which employs a total of 6.5 rounds if a 128-bit user key is used. It is a CRYPTREC recommended e-government cipher. In this paper we describe one 4.75-round differential characteristic with probability 2-126 of SC2000 and thirty 4.75-round differential characteristics with probability 2-127. Finally, we exploit these 4.75-round differentials to conduct a differential cryptanalysis attack on a 5-round reduced version of SC2000 when used with a 128-bit key. The attack suggests for the first time that the safety margin of SC2000 with a 128-bit key decreases below one and a half rounds. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2009 | 10.1007/978-3-642-16342-5_4 | IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
5-round reduced version,half round,128-bit key,e-government cipher,128-bit user key,128-bit key decrease,user key,differential characteristic,sc2000 block cipher,128-bit block cipher,differential cryptanalysis attack,block cipher,differential cryptanalysis | Conference | 2010 |
Issue | ISSN | ISBN |
3 | 0020-0190 | 3-642-16341-6 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
6 | 0.54 | 52 |
Authors | ||
5 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Jiqiang Lu | 1 | 39 | 4.29 |
Wun-She Yap | 2 | 105 | 17.55 |
Matt Henricksen | 3 | 131 | 13.55 |
Swee-Huay Heng | 4 | 384 | 47.50 |
吕继强 | 5 | 6 | 0.54 |