Title
Differential a1ttack on five rounds of the SC2000 block cipher
Abstract
SC2000 is a 128-bit block cipher with a user key of 128, 192 or 256 bits, which employs a total of 6.5 rounds if a 128-bit user key is used. It is a CRYPTREC recommended e-government cipher. In this paper we describe one 4.75-round differential characteristic with probability 2-126 of SC2000 and thirty 4.75-round differential characteristics with probability 2-127. Finally, we exploit these 4.75-round differentials to conduct a differential cryptanalysis attack on a 5-round reduced version of SC2000 when used with a 128-bit key. The attack suggests for the first time that the safety margin of SC2000 with a 128-bit key decreases below one and a half rounds.
Year
DOI
Venue
2009
10.1007/978-3-642-16342-5_4
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Keywords
DocType
Volume
5-round reduced version,half round,128-bit key,e-government cipher,128-bit user key,128-bit key decrease,user key,differential characteristic,sc2000 block cipher,128-bit block cipher,differential cryptanalysis attack,block cipher,differential cryptanalysis
Conference
2010
Issue
ISSN
ISBN
3
0020-0190
3-642-16341-6
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
6
0.54
52
Authors
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jiqiang Lu1394.29
Wun-She Yap210517.55
Matt Henricksen313113.55
Swee-Huay Heng438447.50
吕继强560.54