Paper Info
Title
Evolutionary Mechanism and Information Supervision of Public Opinions in Internet Emergency.
Abstract
This paper studies evolutionary mechanism and information supervision of public opinions in Internet emergency. The netizen behaviors are characterized by observation, imitation and learning, which well fits the hypothesis of bounded rationality in evolutionary games. In this paper, we define the "netizen acceptance degree" in cases of some social hot topics as the pay off in factor games, and build the evolutionary equation of public opinions, which is the infectious diseases diffusion model with changing population size. Alter that, we apply the theoretical model to the evolutionary course of pubic opinions in a real Internet emergency case, i.e., the "10.24 Self-sacrifice Event" in China. The effects of Internet information supervision and control measures for social affairs on the evolutionary course of public opinions are discussed based on results of numerical simulation. (C) 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Year
DOI
Venue
2013
10.1016/j.procs.2013.05.124
Procedia Computer Science
Keywords
Field
DocType
Public opinions,Internet emergency,Evolutionary game,Information supervision,Evolutionary mechanism
Computer science,Knowledge management,Imitation,Bounded rationality,Netizen,Stochastic game,The Internet
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
17
1877-0509
2
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.40
1
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Dehai Liu151.85
Weiguo Wang250.84
Hongyi Li3138377.85