Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Microprocessors are the heart of the devices we rely on every day. However, their non-volatile memory, which often contains sensitive information, can be manipulated by ultraviolet (UV) irradiation. This paper gives practical results demonstrating that the non-volatile memory can be erased with UV light by investigating the effects of UV-Clight with a wavelength of 254 nm on four different depackaged microcontrollers. We demonstrate that an adversary can use this effect to attack an AES software implementation by manipulating the 256- bit S-box table. We show that if only a single byte of the table is changed, 2 500 pairs of correct and faulty encrypted inputs are sufficient to recover the key with a probability of 90%, in case the key schedule is not modified by the attack. Furthermore, we emphasize this by presenting a practical attack on an AES implementation running on an 8-bit microcontroller. Our attack involves only a standard decapsulation procedure and the use of alow-cost UV lamp. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2009 | 10.1109/FDTC.2009.37 | Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography |
Keywords | DocType | ISBN |
256-bit s-box table,aes implementation,alow-cost uv lamp,practical attack,practical result,non-volatile memory,uv light,aes software implementation,key schedule,8-bit microcontroller,optical fault attacks | Conference | 978-1-4244-4972-9 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
17 | 1.20 | 12 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jörn-Marc Schmidt | 1 | 300 | 19.25 |
| Michael Hutter | 2 | 345 | 25.26 |
| Thomas Plos | 3 | 235 | 19.19 |