Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The importance of reasoning about recognizability has recently been stressed in finding type flaw attacks, in which a protocol message may be forged from another message. However, the problem of deciding recognizability has never been fully exploited. To fill this gap, we present a terminating procedure to decide recognizability under the standard Dolev-Yao model. By incorporating the proposed procedure with Athena, a well-know security protocol verifier, our experiments succeed in finding potential type flaw attacks. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2010 | 10.1007/978-3-642-18178-8_35 | ISC |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
well-know security protocol verifier,dolev-yao intruder model,protocol message,proposed procedure,type flaw attack,potential type flaw attack,standard dolev-yao model,security protocol,formal methods,verification,security,formal method | Cryptographic protocol,Computer science,Computer security,Formal methods | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
6531 | 0302-9743 | 2 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.36 | 21 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zhiwei Li | 1 | 1315 | 107.73 |
| Weichao Wang | 2 | 500 | 33.87 |