Title
Towards efficient traffic-analysis resistant anonymity networks
Abstract
Existing IP anonymity systems tend to sacrifice one of low latency, high bandwidth, or resistance to traffic-analysis. High-latency mix-nets like Mixminion batch messages to resist traffic-analysis at the expense of low latency. Onion routing schemes like Tor deliver low latency and high bandwidth, but are not designed to withstand traffic analysis. Designs based on DC-nets or broadcast channels resist traffic analysis and provide low latency, but are limited to low bandwidth communication. In this paper, we present the design, implementation, and evaluation of Aqua, a high-bandwidth anonymity system that resists traffic analysis. We focus on providing strong anonymity for BitTorrent, and evaluate the performance of Aqua using traces from hundreds of thousands of actual BitTorrent users. We show that Aqua achieves latency low enough for efficient bulk TCP flows, bandwidth sufficient to carry BitTorrent traffic with reasonable efficiency, and resistance to traffic analysis within anonymity sets of hundreds of clients. We conclude that Aqua represents an interesting new point in the space of anonymity network designs.
Year
DOI
Venue
2013
10.1145/2486001.2486002
SIGCOMM
Keywords
Field
DocType
ip anonymity system,high-bandwidth anonymity system,low latency,resistant anonymity network,traffic analysis,anonymity set,latency low enough,bittorrent traffic,towards efficient traffic-analysis,anonymity network design,low bandwidth communication,high bandwidth
Traffic analysis,Computer science,Computer security,Latency (engineering),Computer network,Bandwidth (signal processing),BitTorrent,Anonymity,Latency (engineering),Broadcast channels,Onion routing,Distributed computing
Conference
Volume
Issue
ISSN
43
4
0146-4833
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
17
0.76
22
Authors
6
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Stevens Le Blond1483.09
David R. Choffnes2134292.81
Wenxuan Zhou3816.51
Peter Druschel48715861.36
Hitesh Ballani5138663.25
Paul Francis65420738.15