Title
Manipulating an aggregation rule under ordinally fuzzy preferences
Abstract
It is well known that many aggregation rules are manipulable through strategic behaviour. Typically, the aggregation rules considered in the literature are social choice correspondences. In this paper the aggregation rules of interest are social welfare functions (SWFs). We investigate the problem of constructing a SWF that is non-manipulable. In this context, individuals attempt to manipulate a social ordering as opposed to a social choice. Using techniques from an ordinal version of fuzzy set theory, we introduce a class of ordinally fuzzy binary relations of which exact binary relations are a special case. Operating within this family enables us to prove an impossibility theorem. This theorem states that all non-manipulable SWFs are dictatorial, provided that they are not constant. This theorem uses a weaker transitivity condition than the one in Perote-Peña and Piggins (J Math Econ 43:564–580, 2007), and the ordinal framework we employ is more general than the cardinal setting used there. We conclude by considering several ways of circumventing this impossibility theorem.
Year
DOI
Venue
2010
10.1007/s00355-009-0405-5
Social Choice and Welfare
Keywords
Field
DocType
binary relation,social choice,fuzzy set theory,social order
Welfare economics,Social choice theory,Mathematical economics,Arrow's impossibility theorem,Ordinal number,Unrestricted domain,Binary relation,Fuzzy logic,Fuzzy set,Mathematics,Transitive relation
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
34
3
1432-217X
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
3
0.56
6
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Conal Duddy1344.54
Juan Perote-Peña2182.58
Ashley Piggins3354.42