Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The McEliece public key cryptosystem (PKC) is regarded as secure in the presence of quantum computers because no efficient quantum algorithm is known for the underlying problems, which this cryptosystem is built upon. As we show in this paper, a straightforward implementation of this system may feature several side channels. Specifically, we present a Timing Attack which was executed successfully against a software implementation of the McEliece PKC. Furthermore, the critical system components for key generation and decryption are inspected to identify channels enabling power and cache attacks. Implementation aspects are proposed as countermeasures to face these attacks. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2008 | 10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15 | PQCrypto |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
efficient quantum algorithm,software implementation,side channels,quantum computer,mceliece public key cryptosystem,straightforward implementation,critical system component,key generation,mceliece pkc,timing attack,implementation aspect,side channel attack,quantum algorithm,side channel attacks,post quantum cryptography | Key generation,Post-quantum cryptography,Computer security,Quantum computer,Computer network,Cryptosystem,Timing attack,Side channel attack,Quantum cryptography,Engineering,McEliece cryptosystem | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
5299 | 0302-9743 | 34 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
1.20 | 15 | 5 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Falko Strenzke | 1 | 98 | 7.01 |
| Erik Tews | 2 | 281 | 20.11 |
| H. Gregor Molter | 3 | 108 | 6.83 |
| Raphael Overbeck | 4 | 162 | 9.55 |
| Abdulhadi Shoufan | 5 | 162 | 20.42 |