Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Time-stamping protocols, which assure that a document was existed at a certain time, are applied to some useful and practical applications such as electronic patent applications and so on. There are two major time-stamping protocols, the simple protocol and the linking protocol. In the former, a time-stamp authority issues a time-stamp token that is the digital signature of the concatenated value of a hashed message and the present time. In the latter, the time-stamp authority issues a time-stamp token that is the hash value of the concatenated value of a hashed message and the previous hash value. Although security requirements and analysis for above time-stamping protocols has been discussed, there are no strict cryptographic security notions for them. In this paper, we reconsider the security requirements for time-stamping protocols and define security notions for them, in a universally composable security sense, which was proposed by Canetti. We also show that these notions can be achieved using combinations of a secure key exchange protocol, a secure symmetric encryption scheme, and a secure digital signature scheme. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2005 | IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive | time-stamp authority issue,security notion,hashed message,concatenated value,previous hash value,hash value,time-stamping protocol,security requirement,universal composable security,composable security sense,strict cryptographic security notion,time-stamping protocols |
DocType | Volume | ISSN |
Conference | 2005 | 0922-6389 |
ISBN | Citations | PageRank |
1-58603-550-9 | 14 | 0.69 |
References | Authors | |
24 | 2 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Toshihiko Matsuo | 1 | 67 | 3.75 |
| Shin'ichiro Matsuo | 2 | 116 | 16.05 |