Title
Multi-outcome and Multidimensional Market Scoring Rules
Abstract
Hanson's market scoring rules allow us to design a prediction market that still gives useful information even if we have an illiquid market with a limited number of budget-constrained agents. Each agent can "move" the current price of a market towards their prediction. While this movement still occurs in multi-outcome or multidimensional markets we show that no market-scoring rule, under reasonable conditions, always moves the price directly towards beliefs of the agents. We present a modified version of a market scoring rule for budget-limited traders, and show that it does have the property that, from any starting position, optimal trade by a budget-limited trader will result in the market being moved towards the trader's true belief. This mechanism also retains several attractive strategic properties of the market scoring rule.
Year
Venue
Field
2012
CoRR
Scoring rule,Mathematical economics,Economics,Prediction market,Microeconomics,Order (exchange)
DocType
Volume
Citations 
Journal
abs/1202.1712
1
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.37
1
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Lance Fortnow12788352.32
Rahul Sami254154.42