Title
The Nucleolus Of The Bankruptcy Problem By Hydraulic Rationing
Abstract
In this note, we give a straightforward and elementary proof of a theorem by Aumann and Maschler stating that in the well-known bankruptcy problem, the so-called CG-consistent solution described by the Talmud represents the nucleolus of the corresponding coalitional game. The proof nicely fits into the hydraulic rationing framework proposed by Kaminski. We point out further interesting properties in connection with this framework.
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.1142/S0219198912500077
INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Keywords
Field
DocType
Bankruptcy problem, Talmud rule, nucleolus, hydraulic rationing
Mathematical economics,Economics,Bankruptcy problem,Microeconomics,Elementary proof,Rationing,Talmud
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
14
1
0219-1989
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
3
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Tamás Fleiner124127.45
Balázs Sziklai2123.50