Title
The Role of Anticipation on Cooperation and Coordination in Simulated Prisoner's Dilemma Game Playing
Abstract
We present a connectionist model for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game which we explored in different game-playing environments. The role of anticipation on cooperation and coordination was our main interest. The model was validated by comparisons with human subjects' experiments in which subjects played individually against a computer opponent. After reproducing several interesting characteristics of individual play, we used the model in multi-agent simulations of small societies in which agents interacted among each-other by playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. In genetic simulations, we demonstrated how anticipation will evolve in the societies to achieve either higher cooperation rates or payoffs. Our results favor the assumption that anticipation is decisive for high level of cooperation and higher cooperative coordination in the simulated societies.
Year
DOI
Venue
2008
10.1007/978-3-642-02565-5_12
ABiALS
Keywords
Field
DocType
genetic simulation,higher cooperation rate,dilemma game,computer opponent,iterated prisoner,human subject,different game-playing environment,higher cooperative coordination,simulated prisoner,high level,connectionist model,prisoner s dilemma
Social psychology,Simultaneous game,Anticipation,Prisoner's dilemma,Cognitive psychology,Psychology,Deadlock (game theory),Adversary,Dilemma,Superrationality,Connectionism
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
5499
0302-9743
1
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.36
3
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Maurice Grinberg15338.54
Emilian Lalev251.22