Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond–Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent's type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. Via a simple argument, it is shown that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences—and, in particular, for a constrained-efficient allocation whether first-best or not. The crucial assumption is independence. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2007 | 10.1016/j.jet.2006.11.004 | Journal of Economic Theory |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
D82,G21 | Journal | 137 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 0022-0531 | 3 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.82 | 1 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| David Andolfatto | 1 | 9 | 2.78 |
| Ed Nosal | 2 | 5 | 1.70 |
| Neil Wallace | 3 | 9 | 2.32 |