Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this paper we roughly quantify the degree of risk aversion induced by three rationales for corporate risk management: the cost of financial distress, costly external finance, and the principal-agent relationship between shareholders and management. In so doing, we provide a foundation for the use of corporate utility functions. However, we are unable to fully support the degree of risk aversion reported in the decision analysis literature. Specifically, financial distress and costly external finance appear to induce relatively little risk aversion, while principal-agent concerns lend only partial support to published corporate risk tolerance guidelines. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2006 | 10.1287/deca.1060.0080 | Decision Analysis |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
2006. accepted by robert clemen and don kleinmuntz on october 3,corporate risk tolerance guideline,principal-agent concern,corporate risk aversion history: received on january 26,2006 after 2 revisions.,corporate utility functions,corporate risk tolerance,corporate risk management,partial support,Corporate Risk Aversion,risk aversion,utility functions,decision analysis literature,corporate utility function,costly external finance,utility,financial distress,principal-agent relationship | Journal | 3 |
Issue | Citations | PageRank |
4 | 8 | 0.74 |
References | Authors | |
2 | 1 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| J. Eric Bickel | 1 | 111 | 12.96 |