Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Cooperative advertising is an incentive offered by a manufacturer to influence retailers’ promotional decisions. We study a dynamic durable goods duopoly with a manufacturer and two independent and competing retailers. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, announces his wholesale prices and his shares of retailers’ advertising costs, and the retailers in response play a Nash differential game in choosing their optimal retail prices and advertising efforts over time. We obtain the feedback equilibrium policies for the manufacturer and the retailers in explicit form for a linear demand formulation. We investigate issues, like channel coordination and antidiscriminatory legislation, and also study a case, when the manufacturer sells through only one retailer and the second retailer sells a competing brand. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2012 | 10.1007/s10957-012-0034-5 | J. Optimization Theory and Applications |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
durable goods | Duopoly,Channel coordination,Incentive,Advertising,Differential game,Durable good,Legislation,Supply chain,Stackelberg competition,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
154 | 2 | 1573-2878 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
12 | 0.87 | 4 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anshuman Chutani | 1 | 21 | 2.93 |
| Suresh Sethi | 2 | 1215 | 255.98 |