Paper Info
Title
Modeling attacks on physical unclonable functions
Abstract
We show in this paper how several proposed Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) can be broken by numerical modeling attacks. Given a set of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) of a PUF, our attacks construct a computer algorithm which behaves indistinguishably from the original PUF on almost all CRPs. This algorithm can subsequently impersonate the PUF, and can be cloned and distributed arbitrarily. This breaks the security of essentially all applications and protocols that are based on the respective PUF. The PUFs we attacked successfully include standard Arbited PUFs and Ring Oscillator PUFs of arbitrary sizes, and XO Arbiter PUFs, Lightweight Secure PUFs, and Feed-Forward Arbiter PUFs of up to a given size and complexity. Our attacks are based upon various machine learning techniques including Logistic Regression and Evolution Strategies. Our work leads to new design requirements for secure electrical PUFs, and will be useful to PUF designers and attackers alike.
Year
DOI
Venue
2010
10.1145/1866307.1866335
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Keywords
DocType
Volume
cryptanalysis,feed-forward arbiter pufs,lightweight secure pufs,xo arbiter pufs,puf designer,secure electrical pufs,respective puf,computer algorithm,physical cryptography,physical unclonable functions,standard arbited pufs,machine learning,physical unclonable function,ring oscillator pufs,original puf,logistic regression,feed forward,evolution strategy,ring oscillator
Conference
2010
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
228
9.30
16
Authors
6
Search Limit
100228
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Ulrich Rührmair168538.92
Frank Sehnke252739.18
Jan Sölter342618.21
Gideon Dror41761104.44
Srinivas Devadas586061146.30
Jürgen Schmidhuber6178361238.63