Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We study the parameterized control complexity of fallback voting, a voting
system that combines preference-based with approval voting. Electoral control
is one of many different ways for an external agent to tamper with the outcome
of an election. We show that adding and deleting candidates in fallback voting
are W[2]-hard for both the constructive and destructive case, parameterized by
the amount of action taken by the external agent. Furthermore, we show that
adding and deleting voters in fallback voting are W[2]-hard for the
constructive case, parameterized by the amount of action taken by the external
agent, and are in FPT for the destructive case. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2010 | Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research | approval voting,computational complexity |
Field | DocType | Volume |
Discrete mathematics,Preferential block voting,Parameterized complexity,Anti-plurality voting,Voting,Algorithm,Theoretical computer science,Cardinal voting systems,Bullet voting,Mathematics,Condorcet method,Approval voting | Journal | abs/1004.3 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.35 | 8 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gábor Erdélyi | 1 | 261 | 19.34 |
| Michael R. Fellows | 2 | 4138 | 319.37 |