Title
Outsourcing Logistics Channel Coordination With Logistics Service Levels Dependent Market Demand
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to resolve the coordination problems of an outsourcing logistics channel constituted by a Third Party Logistics Service Provider (TPLSP) and a client. High levels of logistics service that the TPLSP provides have a significant impact on customer demand for the client's products. When customer demand is not influenced by levels of logistics service, a properly designed revenue-sharing contract can achieve channel coordination and a win-win outcome. When customer demand is influenced by levels of logistics service, a properly designed combination contract with revenue-sharing and service-cost-sharing can achieve channel coordination and a win-win outcome. Under a revenue-sharing contract and a combination contract with revenue-sharing and service-cost-sharing, the TPLSP needs to undertake some inventory risk.
Year
DOI
Venue
2009
10.1504/IJSTM.2009.022525
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SERVICES TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT
Keywords
Field
DocType
outsourcing, logistics service, incentives, channel coordination, revenue-sharing, service-cost-sharing, game theory
Channel coordination,Economics,Service level objective,Integrated logistics support,Service level,Outsourcing,Service provider,Service level requirement,Humanitarian Logistics,Marketing
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
11
2
1460-6720
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
2
0.38
8
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Qing Wu120.38
Bin Dan231.44