Title
Co-op advertising models in manufacturer-retailer supply chains: A game theory approach
Abstract
In the literature of cooperative (co-op) advertising, the focus of research is on a relationship in which a manufacturer is the leader and retailers are followers. This relationship implies the dominance of the manufacturer over retailers. Recent market structure reviews have shown a shift of retailing power from manufacturers to retailers. Retailers have equal or even greater power than a manufacturer when it comes to retailing. Based on this new market phenomenon, we intend to explore the role of vertical co-op advertising efficiency with respect to transactions between a manufacturer and a retailer through brand name investments, local advertising expenditures, and sharing rules of advertising expenses. Three co-op advertising models are discussed which are based on two noncooperative games and one cooperative game. In a leader–follower noncooperative game, the manufacturer is assumed to be a leader who first specifies the brand name investment and the co-op subsidization policy. The retailer, as a follower, then decides on the local advertising level. In a noncooperative simultaneous move game, the manufacturer and the retailer are assumed to act simultaneously and independently. In a cooperative game, the system profit is maximized for every Pareto efficient co-op advertising scheme, but not for any other schemes. All Pareto efficient co-op advertising schemes are associated with a single local advertising level and a single brand name investment level, but with variable sharing policies of advertising expenses. The best Pareto efficient advertising scheme is obtained taking members' risk attitudes into account. Utilizing the Nash bargaining model, we discuss two situations that (a) both members are risk averse, and (b) both members are risk neutral. Our results are consistent with the bargaining literature.
Year
DOI
Venue
2001
10.1016/S0377-2217(00)00327-1
European Journal of Operational Research
Keywords
Field
DocType
Decision analysis,Game theory,Co-op advertising,Equilibrium,Coordination,Bargaining problems,Utilities
Market structure,Subsidy,Economics,Advertising,Risk neutral,Microeconomics,Supply chain,Game theory,Risk aversion,Pareto principle,Bargaining problem
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
135
3
0377-2217
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
65
5.43
2
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Zhimin Huang1746.69
Susan X. Li228543.72