Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
. Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players
are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium
payoff. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
1998 | 10.1007/s001820050066 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Key words: Repeated games of incomplete information,stochastic games | Welfare economics,Combinatorial game theory,Mathematical economics,Repeated game,Probability distribution,Bayesian game,Complete information,Mathematics,Stochastic game,Alphabet | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
27 | 2 | 0020-7276 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
5 | 1.82 | 0 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abraham Neyman | 1 | 225 | 43.91 |
| Sylvain Sorin | 2 | 300 | 49.48 |