Title
A Bargaining Model For Finite N-Person Multi-Criteria Games
Abstract
In this paper a multi-criteria game model, which allows interactions between players, is studied. The problem addressed is considered as a cooperative game in order to achieve consensus solutions which are evaluated with respect to several criteria simultaneously. The main idea consists of analyzing finite multi-criteria n-person games as multi-criteria bargaining games. The notion of Pareto-optimal guaranteed payoffs as a generalization of the maximin values of scalar games is proposed, together with a solution concept which can be characterized as the solutions of multi-criteria linear programming problems. A procedure to incorporate additional information about the players' preferences in order to reach a final consensus is also provided.
Year
DOI
Venue
2009
10.1142/S0219198909002212
INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Keywords
Field
DocType
Finite multi-criteria games, bargaining games, multi-criteria analysis
Combinatorial game theory,Minimax,Mathematical optimization,Mathematical economics,Scalar (physics),Game theory,Linear programming,Solution concept,Sequential game,Mathematics,Bargaining problem
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
11
2
0219-1989
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
5
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Luisa Monroy1296.05
Amparo M. Mármol2568.05
V. Rubiales341.24