Paper Info
Title
The Good, The Bad, or the Ugly? An Empirical Investigation of Revoking Behavior on eBay.
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate a crucial aspect of treputation mechanism design in electronic markets ‐ the ability of buyers and sellers to revo ke or mutually withdraw negative feedback and ratings. Based on recent changes in eBay feedback m echanism, we find that the two-way reputation system enables certain sellers to behave opportunistically by revoking negative feedbacks they receive. This makes the reputation sless effective in discerning the quality of sellers. We also find that changes in the reputatio n system have a significant influence on these sellers’ behavior. After revoking is not possible o n eBay, sellers put more efforts in the transactions. Our findings support the moral hazard assumption regarding seller’s strategic behavior. We also discuss the implications of the a bove findings to reputation mechanism design and practice.
Year
DOI
Venue
2009
10.2139/ssrn.1664822
ICIS
Keywords
Field
DocType
mechanism design
Reputation system,Computer science,Strategic behavior,Microeconomics,Moral hazard,Electronic markets,Mechanism design,Marketing,Form of the Good,Reputation
Conference
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
0
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Shun Ye1274.23
Guodong (Gordon) Gao245527.90
Siva Viswanathan332729.10