Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
For 2-convex n-person cooperative TU games, the nucleolus is determined as some type of constrained equal award rule. Its proof is based
on Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley’s geometrical characterization for the intersection of the prekernel with the core. Pairwise
bargaining ranges within the core are required to be in equilibrium. This system of non-linear equations is solved and its
unique solution agrees with the nucleolus. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2010 | 10.1007/s00182-009-0216-z | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
cooperative game · 2-convex n-person game · core · nucleolus,nucleolus,linear equations,core | Pairwise comparison,Mathematical economics,Regular polygon,Bondareva–Shapley theorem,Mathematics,Nucleolus | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
39 | 1 | 1432-1270 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.80 | 2 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Theo S. H. Driessen | 1 | 49 | 11.00 |
| Dongshuang Hou | 2 | 11 | 6.27 |