Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We consider the problem of preference elicitation in multiattribute auctions. Multiattribute auctions allow multilateral negotiation over non-price based attributes such as quality, time- of-delivery, processor speed, etc. In this paper we study the preference elicitation properties of proxied and iterative multiattribute auctions. Proxy agents sit between participants and a price-based auction, and maintain partial information about preferences and elicit additional information only when necessary. We present empirical results to demonstrate the advantage of linear- vs. non-linear prices, and of asynchronous vs. synchronous price-updates, and demon- strate the role of proxy agents in reducing the number of queries and speeding up auctions. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2003 | 10.1145/779928.779965 | ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
asynchronous updates,empirical result,preference elicitation saving,preference elicitation,proxy agent,proxy bidding agent,minimal price space,asynchronous price-based multiattribute auction,proxied multiattribute auction,processor speed,efficient multiattribute auction,auctions,economics,tradeoff,efficiency,revenue | Asynchronous communication,Preference elicitation,Computer science,Microeconomics,Common value auction,Proxy bid,Negotiation | Conference |
ISBN | Citations | PageRank |
1-58113-679-X | 13 | 1.93 |
References | Authors | |
14 | 2 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aditya V. Sunderam | 1 | 15 | 2.35 |
| David C. Parkes | 2 | 3293 | 342.69 |