Abstract | ||
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A distance bounding protocol provides an upper bound on the distance between communicating parties by measuring the round-trip time between challenges and responses. It is an effective countermeasure against mafia fraud attacks (a.k.a. relay attacks). The adversary success probability of previous distance bounding protocols without a final confirmation message such as digital signature or message authentication code is at least (3/8)(n) = (1/2.67)(n). We propose a unilateral distance bounding protocol without a final confirmation message, which reduces the adversary success probability to (5/16)(n) = (1/3.2)(n). |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2013 | 10.1587/transinf.E96.D.134 | IEICE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION AND SYSTEMS |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
mafia fraud attack, distance bounding, authentication, security | Journal | E96D |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 0916-8532 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 2 | 5 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Myung-Ho Park | 1 | 2 | 0.70 |
Ki-Gon Nam | 2 | 2 | 1.04 |
Jin Seok Kim | 3 | 56 | 6.25 |
Dae Hyun Yum | 4 | 315 | 24.95 |
Pil Joong Lee | 5 | 1039 | 103.09 |