Title
Inefficiency in Networks with Multiple Sources and Sinks
Abstract
We study the problem of optimizing traffic in decentralized transportation networks, where the cost of a link depends on its congestion. If users of a transportation network are permitted to choose their own routes, they generally try to minimize their personal travel time. In the absence of centralized coordination, such a behavior can be inefficient for society and even for each individual user. This inefficiency can be quantified by the "price of anarchy", the ratio of the suboptimal total cost to the socially optimal cost. Here we study the price of anarchy in multi-commodity networks, (i.e., networks where traffic simultaneously flows between different origins and destinations).
Year
DOI
Venue
2009
10.1007/978-3-642-02466-5_32
Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
Keywords
Field
DocType
flow optimization,transportation network,Nash equilibrium,multi-commodity flow
Flow network,Mathematical economics,Flow optimization,Control theory,Inefficiency,Operations research,Price of anarchy,Optimal cost,Nash equilibrium,Travel time,Total cost,Mathematics
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
4
1867-8211
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
6
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
HyeJin Youn172.30
Michael T. Gastner261.72
Hawoong Jeong3988190.47