Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Building upon a central paradigm of evolutionary game theory, namely the invasion barrier, we propose the new Infection and Immunization Dynamics (InfImmDyn), modelling a plausible adaptation process in a large population. For general games, this yields a novel refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept based on dynamical arguments, close in spirit to Nash's original “mass action” idea in his Ph.D. thesis. For partnership games, InfImmDyn exhibits a better asymptotic behavior compared to other popular procedures like Fictitious Play and Replicator Dynamics. We establish even support separation of InfImmDyn in finite time, which can never be achieved by any interior-point method like those mentioned above. In fact, this property has not yet been established for any other evolutionary game dynamics. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2011 | 10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.004 | Games and Economic Behavior |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
C73,C72 | Evolutionarily stable strategy,Mathematical economics,Economics,Epsilon-equilibrium,Best response,Equilibrium selection,Repeated game,Game theory,Solution concept,Nash equilibrium | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
71 | 1 | 0899-8256 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
28 | 1.48 | 13 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Samuel Rota Bulò | 1 | 564 | 33.69 |
| Immanuel M. Bomze | 2 | 922 | 87.13 |