Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This article studies how a mechanism designer can influence games by promising payments to the players depending on their mutual choice of strategies. First, we investigate the cost of implementing a desirable behavior and present algorithms to compute this cost. Whereas a mechanism designer can decide efficiently whether strategy profiles can be implemented at no cost at all our complexity analysis indicates that computing an optimal implementation is generally NP-hard. Second, we introduce and analyze the concept of leverage in a game. The leverage captures the benefits that a benevolent or a malicious mechanism designer can achieve by implementing a certain strategy profile region within economic reason, i.e., by taking the implementation cost into account. Mechanism designers can often manipulate games and change the social welfare by a larger extent than the amount of money invested. Unfortunately, computing the leverage turns out to be intractable as well in the general case. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2011 | 10.1142/S0219198911002824 | INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
social welfare,mechanism design | Economics,Mathematical economics,Leverage (finance),Microeconomics,Payment,Social Welfare | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
13 | 1 | 0219-1989 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.39 | 14 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Raphael Eidenbenz | 1 | 42 | 6.92 |
| Yvonne Anne Pignolet | 2 | 118 | 21.26 |
| Stefan Schmid | 3 | 559 | 71.98 |
| Roger Wattenhofer | 4 | 1377 | 67.13 |