Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This paper introduces a framework for screening cargo containers for nuclear material at security stations throughout the
United States using knapsack problem, reliability, and Bayesian probability models. The approach investigates how to define
a system alarm given a set of screening devices, and hence, designs and analyzes next-generation security system architectures. Containers
that yield a system alarm undergo secondary screening, where more effective and intrusive screening devices are used to further
examine containers for nuclear and radiological material. It is assumed that there is a budget for performing secondary screening
on containers that yield a system alarm. This paper explores the relationships and tradeoffs between prescreening, secondary
screening costs, and the efficacy of radiation detectors. The key contribution of this analysis is that it provides a risk-based
framework for determining how to define a system alarm for screening cargo containers given limited screening resources. The
analysis suggests that highly accurate prescreening is the most important factor for effective screening, particularly when
screening tests are highly dependent, and that moderately accurate prescreening may not be an improvement over treating all
cargo containers the same. Moreover, it suggests that screening tests with high true alarm rates may mitigate some of the
risk associated with low prescreening intelligence. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2011 | 10.1007/s10479-009-0667-4 | Annals of Operations Research |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Port security,Knapsack problem,Linear programming,Reliability | Journal | 172 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 0254-5330 | 6 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.57 | 3 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Laura A. Mclay | 1 | 192 | 15.16 |
| Jamie D. Lloyd | 2 | 6 | 0.57 |
| Emily Niman | 3 | 6 | 0.57 |