Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The river sharing problem deals with the fair distribution of welfare resulting from the optimal allocation of water among a set of riparian agents. Ambec and Sprumont [Sharing a river, J. Econ. Theor. 107, 453-462] address this problem by modeling it as a cooperative TU-game on the set of riparian agents. Solutions to that problem are reviewed in this article. These solutions are obtained via an axiomatic study on the class of river TU-games or via a market mechanism. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2013 | 10.1142/S0219198913400161 | INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Core, externalities, graph games, marginal vectors, river sharing problem | Market mechanism,Economics,Axiom,Microeconomics,Cooperative game theory,Externality,Welfare,Riparian zone | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
15 | 3 | 0219-1989 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.53 | 10 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sylvain Béal | 1 | 70 | 12.23 |
| Amandine Ghintran | 2 | 5 | 1.61 |
| Eric Rémila | 3 | 329 | 45.22 |
| Philippe Solal | 4 | 79 | 14.55 |