Paper Info
Title
On The Value Of A Well Chosen Bit To The Seller In An Auction
Abstract
A central fact in the theory of optimal auction design is that the seller of a single object in an auction with n bidders, having independent, random valuations, typically cannot extract the full maximum value of the object from the buyers. We show that if the seller has access to a single bit of information, even if noisy, then the seller can extract full value. The work is meant to explore the use of information measures in mechanism design problems.
Year
DOI
Venue
2005
10.1109/ISIT.2005.1523341
2005 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), Vols 1 and 2
Keywords
Field
DocType
mechanism design,game theory,information theory,commerce
English auction,Discrete mathematics,Vickrey auction,Mathematical optimization,Computer science,Generalized second-price auction,Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction,Auction theory,Revenue equivalence,Reverse auction,Auction algorithm
Conference
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
1
Authors
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Bruce Hajek115417.84