Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
An important element of social choice theory are impossibility theorems, such as Arrow's theorem and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem, which state that under certain natural constraints, social choice mechanisms are impossible to construct. In recent years, beginning in Kalai'01, much work has been done in finding \text it{robust} versions of these theorems, showing that impossibility remains even when the constraints are \text it{almost} always satisfied. In this work we present an Algebraic scheme for producing such results. We demonstrate it for a variant of Arrow's theorem, found in Dokow and Holzman [5]. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2011 | 10.1109/FOCS.2011.72 | FOCS |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
impossibility theorem,robust social choice impossibility,certain natural constraint,important element,social choice mechanism,social choice theory,recent year,algebraic proof,algebraic scheme,social choice,vectors,algebra,kernel,laplace equation,tin,representation theory,satisfiability,encoding,robustness,tensile stress,social sciences | Discrete mathematics,Social choice theory,Combinatorics,Arrow's impossibility theorem,May's theorem,Algebraic number,Unrestricted domain,Proof of impossibility,Impossibility,Representation theory,Mathematics | Conference |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
0272-5428 | 1 | 0.36 |
References | Authors | |
6 | 2 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dvir Falik | 1 | 18 | 3.06 |
| Ehud Friedgut | 2 | 440 | 38.93 |