Title
How social structure and institutional order co-evolve beyond instrumental rationality
Abstract
This study proposes an agent-based model where adaptively learning agents with local vision who are situated in the Prisoner's Dilemma game change their strategy and location as well. Besides both the copying-highest-scoring strategy and the tie dissolution among defectors as the instrumental rationale, two other heuristics are considered: following-the-majority in the influence process; and the tie dissociation between cooperators and defectors in the selection process. Under the overall setting which is not favorable to cooperation, it turned out that cooperative culture is less likely to emerge and its transmission is more unstable when more agents stick to follow the trend on the fixed network. Given the same set of conditions but with the small amount of social plasticity, cooperative culture is much more likely to emerge and sustain on a hierarchical network where the average clustering coefficient is higher and the average path length is still similar compared to those of the equivalent random network when the small degree of freedom from defectors is allowed to defectors only; much higher and slightly longer, respectively, when cooperators also have that freedom.
Year
DOI
Venue
2008
10.1145/1388969.1388975
GECCO (Companion)
Keywords
Field
DocType
social structure,equivalent random network,small amount,selection process,institutional order co-evolve,copying-highest-scoring strategy,average path length,influence process,cooperative culture,average clustering coefficient,instrumental rationality,fixed network,hierarchical network,degree of freedom,adaptive learning,clustering coefficient,netlogo,prisoner s dilemma
Situated,Average path length,Mathematical optimization,Rationality,Random graph,Homophily,Computer science,Microeconomics,Heuristics,Artificial intelligence,Dilemma,Clustering coefficient
Conference
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
1
Authors
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jae Woo Kim1289.47