Title
Semidefinite complementarity reformulation for robust Nash equilibrium problems with Euclidean uncertainty sets
Abstract
Consider the N-person non-cooperative game in which each player's cost function and the opponents' strategies are uncertain. For such an incomplete information game, the new solution concept called a robust Nash equilibrium has attracted much attention over the past several years. The robust Nash equilibrium results from each player's decision-making based on the robust optimization policy. In this paper, we focus on the robust Nash equilibrium problem in which each player's cost function is quadratic, and the uncertainty sets for the opponents' strategies and the cost matrices are represented by means of Euclidean and Frobenius norms, respectively. Then, we show that the robust Nash equilibrium problem can be reformulated as a semidefinite complementarity problem (SDCP), by utilizing the semidefinite programming (SDP) reformulation technique in robust optimization. We also give some numerical example to illustrate the behavior of robust Nash equilibria.
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.1007/s10898-011-9719-9
J. Global Optimization
Keywords
Field
DocType
Non-cooperative games,Robust Nash equilibrium,Semidefinite programming,Semidefinite complementarity problems
Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Epsilon-equilibrium,Risk dominance,Best response,Equilibrium selection,Normal-form game,Solution concept,Nash equilibrium,Folk theorem,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
53
1
0925-5001
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
4
0.48
12
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Ryoichi Nishimura160.91
Shunsuke Hayashi2865.31
Masao Fukushima32050172.73