Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Luminaries such as Nash (1953), Raiffa (1953), and Selten (1960), studied cooperation in two-person strategic games. We point out that when players may make monetary side payments, i.e., bimatrix games with transferable utility (TU), all previous solutions coincide. This solution is justified by simple axioms and an elementary decomposition of every such game into a (competitive) zero-sum game and a (cooperative) team game. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2011 | 10.1145/1978721.1978725 | SIGecom Exchanges |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
person game,previous solution,elementary decomposition,transferable utility,monetary side payment,team game,two-person strategic game,bimatrix game,zero-sum game,simple axiom,zero sum game | Combinatorial game theory,Mathematical economics,Economics,Microeconomics,Repeated game,Game theory,Transferable utility,Normal-form game,Symmetric game,Sequential game,Non-cooperative game | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
10 | 1 | 1551-9031 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 1 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adam Kalai | 1 | 44 | 6.47 |
| Ehud Kalai | 2 | 135 | 44.65 |