Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This article shows that, for any transferable utility game in coalitional form with a nonempty coalition structure core, the number of steps required to switch from a payoff configuration out of the coalition structure core to a payoff configuration in the coalition structure core is less than or equal to \((n^2+4n)/4\), where \(n\) is the cardinality of the player set. This number improves the upper bounds found so far. We also provide a sufficient condition for the stability of the coalition structure core, i.e. a condition which ensures the accessibility of the coalition structure core in one step. On the class of simple games, this sufficient condition is also necessary and has a meaningful interpretation. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2013 | 10.1007/s00186-013-0439-4 | Math. Meth. of OR |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
core stability,accessibility | Mathematical optimization,Mathematical economics,Core stability,Cardinality,Transferable utility,Mathematics,Core (game theory),Stochastic game | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
78 | 2 | 1432-5217 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 12 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sylvain Béal | 1 | 70 | 12.23 |
| Eric Rémila | 2 | 329 | 45.22 |
| Philippe Solal | 3 | 79 | 14.55 |