Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
On False Data-Injection Attacks against Power System State Estimation: Modeling and Countermeasures |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
It is critical for a power system to estimate its operation state based on meter measurements in the field and the configuration of power grid networks. Recent studies show that the adversary can bypass the existing bad data detection schemes, posing dangerous threats to the operation of power grid systems. Nevertheless, two critical issues remain open: 1) how can an adversary choose the meters to compromise to cause the most significant deviation of the system state estimation, and 2) how can a system operator defend against such attacks? To address these issues, we first study the problem of finding the optimal attack strategy--i.e., a data-injection attacking strategy that selects a set of meters to manipulate so as to cause the maximum damage. We formalize the problem and develop efficient algorithms to identify the optimal meter set. We implement and test our attack strategy on various IEEE standard bus systems, and demonstrate its superiority over a baseline strategy of random selections. To defend against false data-injection attacks, we propose a protection-based defense and a detection-based defense, respectively. For the protection-based defense, we identify and protect critical sensors and make the system more resilient to attacks. For the detection-based defense, we develop the spatial-based and temporal-based detection schemes to accurately identify data-injection attacks. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2014 | 10.1109/TPDS.2013.92 | IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst. |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
data detection schemes,power grid system,random selections,data-injection attacking strategy,system state estimation,power system,critical issue,detection-based defense,cyber-physical systems,protection-based defense,state estimation,power system security,baseline strategy,power system state estimation,cyber security,ieee standard bus systems,power grid networks,power grid systems operation,optimal attack strategy,power engineering computing,false data-injection attacks,attack strategy,power grids,meter measurements,system operator,security of data,power grid,vectors,sensors,cyber physical systems | Countermeasure,Injection attacks,Computer security,Data detection,Computer science,Electric power system,Power grid,Real-time computing,Cyber-physical system,Operator (computer programming),Adversary | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
25 | 3 | 1045-9219 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
66 | 1.94 | 10 |
Authors | ||
6 | ||