Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We investigate several alternate characterizations of pseudorandom functions (PRFs) and pseudorandom permutations (PRPs) in a concrete security setting. By analyzing the concrete complexity of the reductions between the standard notions and the alternate ones, we show that the latter, while equivalent under polynomial-time reductions, are weaker in the concrete security sense. With these alternate notions, we argue that it is possible to get better concrete security bounds for certain PRF/PRP-based schemes. As an example, we show how using an alternate characterization of a PRF could result in tighter security bounds for some types of message authentication codes. We also use this method to give a simple concrete security analysis of the counter mode of encryption. In addition, our results provide some insight into how injectivity impacts pseudorandomness. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2000 | 10.1007/3-540-44448-3_39 | IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
certain prf,concrete security characterizations,concrete security setting,simple concrete security analysis,alternate characterization,concrete security bound,concrete complexity,tighter security bound,concrete security sense,pseudorandom function,alternate notion,message authentication code,cryptographic protocol,polynomial time,pseudo random function,security analysis | Conference | 2000 |
ISSN | ISBN | Citations |
0302-9743 | 3-540-41404-5 | 7 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
1.27 | 14 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| A DESAI | 1 | 1193 | 140.69 |
| Sara K. Miner | 2 | 378 | 21.20 |