Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this article we deal with multi-criteria simple games which constitute an extension of the basic framework of voting systems and related social-choice situations. We generalize two closely related solution concepts for these games, the stable sets and the core. A relationship between stable sets and minimal winning coalitions is established. Two generalizations of the core for multi-criteria simple games are characterized in terms of veto players. In addition, extended multi-criteria simple games obtained from different aggregation operations, such as union, intersection, marginalization, and composition, are introduced. It is shown that a voting system can be established when these operations are applied to complex voting systems. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2012 | 10.1007/s00355-011-0543-4 | Social Choice and Welfare |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
solution concept,stable set,social choice | Mathematical economics,Voting,Generalization,Social exclusion,Canonical form,Veto,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
39 | 1 | 1432-217X |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 6 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Luisa Monroy | 1 | 29 | 6.05 |
| Francisco R. Fernández | 2 | 176 | 18.42 |