Title
Towards provably secure group key agreement building on group theory
Abstract
Known proposals for key establishment schemes based on combinatorial group theory are often formulated in a rather informal manner. Typically, issues like the choice of a session identifier and parallel protocol executions are not addressed, and no security proof in an established model is provided. Successful attacks against proposed parameter sets for braid groups further decreased the attractivity of combinatorial group theory as a candidate platform for cryptography. We present a 2-round group key agreement protocol that can be proven secure in the random oracle model if a certain group-theoretical problem is hard. The security proof builds on a framework of Bresson et al., and explicitly addresses some issues concerning malicious insiders and also forward secrecy. While being designed as a tool for basing group key agreement on non-abelian groups, our framework also yields a 2-round group key agreement basing on a Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Year
DOI
Venue
2006
10.1007/11958239_22
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Keywords
DocType
Volume
non-abelian group,automorphisms of groups,conjugacy problem,key establishment scheme,security proof,provable security,random oracle model,combinatorial group theory,secure group key agreement,group key establishment,braid group,2-round group key agreement,parallel protocol execution,established model,group key agreement,abelian group,group theory
Conference
2006
ISSN
ISBN
Citations 
0302-9743
3-540-68799-8
4
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.42
25
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
jensmatthias bohli129723.19
Benjamin Glas2445.12
Rainer Steinwandt346357.89