Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Much work has been done to address the need for incentive models in real deployed peer-to-peer networks. In this paper, we discuss problems found with the incentive model in a large, deployed peer-to-peer network, Maze. We evaluate several alternatives, and propose an incentive system that generates preferences for well-behaved nodes while correctly punishing colluders. We discuss our proposal as a hybrid between Tit-for-Tat and EigenTrust, and show its effectiveness through simulation of real traces of the Maze system. Copyright (c) 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2006 | 10.1002/cpe.1190 | CONCURRENCY AND COMPUTATION-PRACTICE & EXPERIENCE |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
P2P, incentive, collusion | Tit for tat,Incentive,Computer science,Computer network,Distributed computing | Conference |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
20 | 2 | 1532-0626 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
33 | 1.99 | 10 |
Authors | ||
6 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qiao Lian | 1 | 235 | 12.64 |
| Yu Peng | 2 | 33 | 2.33 |
| Mao Yang | 3 | 51 | 4.03 |
| Zheng Zhang | 4 | 436 | 15.48 |
| Yafei Dai | 5 | 1035 | 67.19 |
| Xiaoming Li | 6 | 1669 | 92.16 |