Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Examination of the effect of information concerning foregone payoffs on choice behavior reveals a complex pattern. Depending on the environment, this information can facilitate or impair maximization. Our study of nine experimental tasks suggests that the complex pattern can be summarized with the assumption that initially people tend to be highly sensitive, and sometimes too sensitive, to recent foregone payoffs. However, over time, people can learn to adjust their sensitivity depending on the environment they are facing. The implications of this observation to models of human adaptation and to problems of mechanism design are discussed. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2006 | 10.1007/s00182-006-0015-8 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
foregone payoff · adaptive behavior · reinforcement learning · fictitious play · directional learning · bandit problems.,mechanism design,adaptive behavior,reinforcement learning,fictitious play | Welfare economics,Mathematical economics,Fictitious play,Mechanism design,Adaptive behavior,Maximization,Mathematics,Reinforcement learning,Stochastic game | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
34 | 2 | 1432-1270 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
6 | 1.23 | 1 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brit Grosskopf | 1 | 14 | 3.38 |
| Ido Erev | 2 | 80 | 11.55 |
| Eldad Yechiam | 3 | 68 | 9.23 |